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A MANIFESTO FOR VISUAL LEGAL REALISM
Richard K. Sherwin*
Society has become increasingly dependent upon computers in
business and in our personal lives. With each technological
advancement, the practice of law becomes more sophisticated
and, commensurate with this progress, the legal system must
adapt. Courts are facing the need to shed any technophobia and
become more willing to embrace the advances that have the
ability to enhance the efficacy of the legal system.1
For a long time, legal scholars treated law as an autonomous
domain with its own rules and procedures and specialized forms of
discourse.2  There is, of course, some truth to this claim.3  Few
scholars today, however, would deny that the boundary between law
and the culture in which it operates is highly porous.' In my own
work over the last decade, I have concentrated on two intersecting
themes. The first addresses the various ways in which law and
popular culture interpenetrate, with particular emphasis on how
visual culture and multi-modal communication technologies affect
* Professor of Law, Director, Visual Persuasion Project, New York Law School.
1. Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170, 1176 (Pa. 2006).
2. See generally LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927-1960 (G. Edward
White ed., 1986) (exploring the evolution of legal realism); Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's
Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 7-10 (1983) (discussing the "case by case" method of legal
discourse); Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 493, 495-96
(1996) (reviewing NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995)); Richard
Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761,
762 (1987) (discussing how the era of law as an autonomous discipline has ended).
3. See Robert Post, Introduction to LAW AND THE ORDER OF CULTURE, at vii, vii-xvii
(Robert Post ed., 1991); Hugh Baxter, Autopoiesis and The "Relative Autonomy" of Law, 19
CARDOZO L. REV. 1987, 1997 (1998).
4. See generally RICHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES POP (2000) [hereinafter
SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES POP] (discussing the influence of culture on the legal system); see
also Jane B. Baron, Law, Literature, and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity, 108 YALE L.J. 1059,
1074 (1999) ("Early in the twentieth century, legal 'realists' began to question whether legal
principles alone could dictate or explain outcomes .... "). But cf Jack Balkin & Sanford
Levinson, Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy Relationship, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 155, 157
(2006) (noting that today law's central relationship to the humanities "no longer seem[s] so
obvious").
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the content and meaning of law.' The second addresses the
importance of drawing from a variety of disciplines-including
cognitive and social psychology, linguistics, cultural anthropology,
and rhetoric, among other scholarly domains-in studying the
various ways in which legal meanings are constructed and construed,
and with what effect.6
It is a truism that powerful stories win cases.7 But what do we
really know about how a good story is put together? What is in our
communal toolkit to help us make the stories we tell succeed?8 What
role do our mental and cultural categories play in shaping and
informing the judgments that jurors and judges make in response to
the stories lawyers tell?9 How do we know what kind of story (a
mystery? a melodrama? a heroic quest tale?) is the right one to fit the
facts of the case at hand? What sort of characters should the story
feature, and when should they be brought on or escorted off stage so
that the story's moral may be effectively realized? How do we
describe the real source of "trouble" that launched the legal story in
the first place? And now that law has migrated to the screen, both in
court and out, we also need to ask: how do we tell a compelling story
in images as well as words? By grappling directly with these sorts of
meaning making tasks it is possible to develop and apply a more
sophisticated theory of legal practice.
A growing number of scholars are finding that the narratives
lawyers, judges, and jurors tell in the everyday operation of law are
particularly rich sources of insight into the legal meaning making
process. Through a close study of the discourse used by legal (and
non-legal) actors in a variety of legal settings, including visual and
5. RICHARD K. SHERWIN, Law in Popular Culture, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO
LAW AND SOCIETY 95 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004); RICHARD K. SHERWIN, POPULAR CULTURE AND
LAW (2006) (discussing the many intersections of law and culture).
6. Richard K. Sherwin, Lawyering Theory: An Overview: What We Talk About When We
Talk About Law, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 9, 20 (1992) [hereinafter Sherwin, Lawyering Theory]
(arguing for a cultural approach to legal analysis, which calls into question "taken-for-granted
models, prototypes, schemas, or images of self, others, and social institutions that make up
particular social domains and legal practices"); see also Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz,
An Analysis of Closing Arguments to a Jury, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 55 (1992) (examining the
strategic methods lawyers use to convey their stories to juries).
7. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The
Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 528 (1991).
8. See JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING (1990) [hereinafter BRUNER, ACTS].
9. For a good legal application of these elements to tort litigation, see NEAL FEIGENSON,
LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS (2000).
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multi-modal digital forms of discourse, we find not only strategic
clues regarding how a particular judge or advocate may nestle his or
her theory of the case within a familiar story genre, but also how
narratives activate particular memories, values, emotions, and beliefs
under specific circumstances in order to spur particular kinds of
judgments or decisions in a particular case. For example, if it is a
whodunit, a favorite genre among prosecutors, the story's originating
trouble is most likely historical in nature. Something has happened.
A crime has occurred, and it is now up to the decision makers to
solve the mystery. This will require the marshalling of salient evi-
dentiary clues. If they have done their job right, by the time the state
rests its case, the defendant sitting in the courtroom will merge in
the decision maker's mind with the prosecution story's main
character, the culprit who did the deed.
On the other hand, if it is a hero's tale, a genre often favored by
criminal defense lawyers, the jurors most likely will never solve the
prosecutor's mystery. How could they, the defense will argue, in
view of the lack of evidence and the state's failure to make the pieces
of the puzzle fit together. With nothing but disconcerting fragments
floating before their eyes, the decision makers will face a serious
dilemma. They will be sorely challenged by the prosecution's
demand for a conviction; yet, the jurors have sworn an oath to keep
the prosecutors to their burden of proof. Only by summoning the
wisdom and moral courage needed to do the right thing will the
jurors be able to honorably discharge that oath. Only by committing
to a verdict of acquittal will they complete the defense's heroic tale,
for as it turns out, the jurors themselves are the true heroes of the
defense counsel's story-if they can fulfill the role in which they
have been cast. ° As Johnnie Cochran famously argued in the O.J.
Simpson case, if the jurors won't do it, who will?"
Of course, there is no guarantee that the decision makers in a
given case will either yield to the strict narrative logic of the
prosecution or actively fulfill the defense's "subjunctive" (i.e.,
emotionally robust, albeit contingent) 2 invocation to "do the right
thing" and acquit. One thing, however, remains certain. When
10. See Amsterdam & Hertz, supra note 6.
11. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES POP, supra note 4, at 46.
12. JEROME BRUNER, ACTUAL MINDS, POSSIBLE WORLDS 25-26 (1986) [hereinafter
BRUNER, ACTUAL MINDS].
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lawyers set a particular narrative in motion, it is far easier to trigger
expectations about how that particular kind of narrative is supposed
to go. There is also a corollary to this point. It is far easier to cue up
what is already inside the decision maker's head than to insert
something new. 1" We all carry around (for the most part
unconsciously) all the cultural and cognitive building blocks we need
to make sense of what we see and hear around us. We follow fa-
miliar social scripts, and expect others to do the same. And when the
expected script is transgressed in some way, we are quick to fill in
meanings that explain the anomaly while at the same time preserving
the order we expect, and prefer. ("Oh, they must be from out of
town." "What poor manners!" "He must be crazy!")
We are constantly in the business of telling ourselves and others
around us stories that grow out of a surprisingly limited stock of
familiar, frequently recurring narrative types. 4 And when others tell
us their stories we respond knowingly, signaling our comprehension
and emotional support. As well-mannered, acculturated members of
the community, we naturally do our part to engage the storyteller on
his or her own terms, seeking clarifying details as needed (or filling
them in ourselves). 5 This is the way we negotiate social meaning
and maintain a shared reality. Studies show that when the unfamiliar
comes along, our first impulse is to push it, to the extent possible,
toward pre-existing (i.e., familiar) categories or stock frames of
meaning." If there are gaps in an otherwise recognizable story, we
are quick to make it conform to expectation. ("Everyone knows that
these sorts of characters do those sorts of things in that sort of
situation.") For surely, or so it will often seem, this individual is
close enough to what we know and expect of that type, given the
situation in question, for our expectations to be met. As social
psychologists have shown, more often than we consciously realize,
or perhaps care to admit, we tend to see what we expect to see,
whether it is really there or not. 7
13. See AL RIES & JACK TROUT, POSITIONING: THE BATTLE FOR YOUR MIND 5 (1981)
(McGraw-Hill 2001).
14. See generally ROGER C. SCHANK & ROBERT P. ABELSON, SCRIPTS, PLANS, GOALS, AND
UNDERSTANDING: AN INQUIRY INTO HUMAN KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES (1997).
15. See BRUNER, ACTS, supra note 8, at 48 (discussing Grice's "Cooperative Principle").
16. Id. at 57-63, 120-22.
17. See Sherwin, Lawyering Theory, supra note 6, at 23-26.
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And if the social data ultimately do not fit into one of the
familiar templates we have for them in our cognitive stockpot? In
that case, meaning tends to blur and pass out of memory, for there is
nothing to hold it fast in our minds over time. To be sure, there are
far too many inassimilable fragments and details in the whirr and
swirl of everyday life to incorporate everything into shared mental
categories about the real. In fact, our stock of mental short cuts is
there precisely in order to save us the trouble. The cognitive
heuristics that help us to make sense of what goes on around (and
within) us mainly function as a filter in the selection-for-meaning
process. Not surprisingly, given finite mental energy and the
seemingly endless demands of daily events, the meanings that
emerge are largely "pre-packaged," built from readily available
cultural modules or artifacts (if not factoids). What may be
surprising, however, is the seemingly indiscriminate way that we
reach for an available mental category or heuristic. In fact, cognitive
studies have shown that once we internalize the category, we cease to
remember its source. Fiction, it turns out, will do as nicely as non-
fiction when it comes to assimilating categories for thinking and
talking about the real. 8
That is the gist of the so-called "constructionist" view that has
come to dominate the social sciences and humanities. As Jerome
Bruner puts it, "we cannot know an aboriginal reality... [and] any
reality we create is based on a transmutation of some prior 'reality'
that we have taken as given. We construct many realities, and do so
from "differing intentions."' 9  This does not mean that we create
reality out of whole cloth, but rather that we construct it "out of the
myriad forms in which we structure experience."2 Contrary to what
common sense would have us believe, even perception itself is a
construction. Our senses decode and reconstruct external reality
based on an intrinsic as well as a learned, culturally transmitted
18. See RICHARD J. GERRIG, EXPERIENCING NARRATIVE WORLDS: ON THE PSYCHO-
LOGICAL ACTIVITIES OF READING 240 (1993) ("[Fliction will fail to have a real-world impact
only if readers expend explicit effort to understand them as fictional."); see also Deborah A.
Prentice & Richard J. Gerrig, Exploring the Boundary Between Fiction and Reality, in DUAL-
PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 529 (Shelley Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999);
Deborah A. Prentice, Richard J. Gerrig & Daniel Bailis, What Readers Bring to the Processing of
Fictional Texts, 4 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 416 (1997).
19. BRUNER, ACTUAL MINDS, supra note 12, at 158.
20. Id.
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symbolic code. Moreover, the cultural code changes over time,
particularly with the advent of significant changes in the technology
of communication. We have seen this phenomenon before, for
example, in the latter half of the fifteenth century when books began
to displace visual images following Gutenberg's invention of the
printing press. 1 A significant shift in the cultural code has occurred
again in more recent times with the invention and broad
dissemination of visual electronic mass media-particularly film and
television, and the interactive cognitive and social dynamics of
computers and the Internet.2
For our purposes here, suffice it to say that in the quest for
certainty in the legal meaning making process it is incumbent upon
lawyers as well as law teachers to understand the constitutive role
played by dominant forms of communication media together with the
popular story scenarios, character types, and narrative genres that
they feature. Popular communication technologies not only help to
produce cultural and cognitive content; they also provide the mental
tools we use to think (and feel and judge) with. Thus, we may well
ask, how exactly are the technologies of film, television, and the
Internet changing the way law is being practiced, studied, and
reformed?
The current technological moment calls for a new visual legal
realism. The tools for thought and communication that are currently
at hand are creating a revolutionary shift in the practice and
operation of law. As goes popular discourse, so goes legal rhetoric.
How else are lawyers to reach their audience if not by meeting
popular expectations about how meanings are made? That is why,
these days, legal meanings have migrated to the screen. No modem
courtroom lacks for electronic monitors, and most come equipped
21. LEILA AVRIN, SCRIBES, SCRIPT AND BOOKS: THE BOOK ARTS FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE
RENAISSANCE 327 (1991); LUCIEN PAUL VICTOR FEBVRE & HENRI-JEAN MARTIN, THE COMING
OF THE BOOK: THE IMPACT OF PRINTING 1450-1800 (Geoffrey Nowell-Smith & David Wootten
eds., David Gerard trans., 1976). See generally ELIZABETH L. EISENSTEIN, I THE PRINTING
PRESS AS AN AGENT OF CHANGE: COMMUNICATIONS AND CULTURAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN
EARLY MODERN EUROPE (1979); Peter K. Yu, Of Monks, Medieval Scribes, and Middlemen,
2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1.
22. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS
OF CYBERSPACE (1999); Richard A. Bartle, Virtual Worldliness: What the Imaginary Asks of the
Real, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 19 (2004); Beth Simone Noveck, Introduction: The State of Play,
49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1 (2004).
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with platforms for visual projection. Of course, whether lawyers and
judges come into court adequately trained in the craft of producing
and cross examining, or making informed rulings on the
admissibility of visual evidence, or the propriety of visual arguments,
is another matter altogether.23 How long law schools will persist in
the pretense that law remains exclusively a matter of words,
regardless of whether we speak of "law on the books" or "law in
action," only time will tell. But the longer this ostrich-like behavior
continues within the halls of legal academia, the further legal training
will retreat from the practical realities of legal practice.
Consider this essay, then, a manifesto for visual legal realism.
Law scholars still have much to learn from makers and critics of pop
culture such as Andy Warhol and Marshal McLuhan, who rightly
grasped the extent to which the medium is (at the very least an
important part of) the message.24 The point to stress here is that
radical shifts in the technology of communication alter our mind as
well as our culture.25 For example, unlike words on the page, visual
images on the screen are far more likely to directly stimulate
heightened emotional responses.26 Viewers tend to react to screen
23. See Richard K. Sherwin, Neal Feigenson & Christine Spiesel, Law in the Digital Age:
How Visual Communication Technologies Are Transforming the Practice, Theory, and Teaching
of Law, 12 B.U. J. SC. & TECH. L. 227 (2006); see also Neal Feigenson & Meghan A. Dunn, New
Visual Technologies in Court: Directions for Research, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 109, 110
(2003); Saul M. Kassin & Meghan A. Dunn, Computer-Animated Displays and the Jury:
Facilitative and Prejudicial Effects, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269 (1997); Fredric I. Lederer,
Courtroom Technology and Its Educational Implications, 8 VA. EDUC. & PRAC. 3 (1998);
Meghan A. Dunn, Poster Presented at the Annual Conference of the Society for Personality and
Social Psychology: The Effects of Computer Animation on Mock Jurors' Decision Making (Feb.
2001) (copy on file with author).
24. See JOHANNES BIRRINGER, THEATRE, THEORY, POSTMODERNISM 117-18 (1993)
(discussing how Warhol's assimilation to the totalizing commodity system was so complete that
it exemplified the disappearance of art's separate status and of all traditional aesthetic values of
distinction); MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 7
(MIT Press 1994) (1964).
25. See generally WALTER J. ONG, "I See What You Say ": Sense Analogues for Intellect, in
INTERFACES OF THE WORD: STUDIES IN THE EVOLUTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND CULTURE 121
(1977); WALTER J. ONG, RAMUS: METHOD, AND THE DECAY OF DIALOGUE (1958); M. Ethan
Katsh, Cyberspatial Settings and the First Amendment, 104 YALE L.J. 1681 (1995).
26. Recent studies have shown that this kind of emotional stimulation is especially
discernible in the use of video games. See, e.g., Steven Reinberg, Video Game Violence Goes
Straight to Kids' Heads, HEALTHDAY, Nov. 28, 2006, http://www.healthday.com/
Article.asp?AID=536261. Reinberg's article reported on the first radiological study to demon-
strate that "violent video games can affect brain physiology and the way the brain functions."
According to a lead researcher on the report, Dr. Vincent Matthews, "[a]fter playing a violent
video game, these adolescents had an increased activity in the amygdala, which is involved in
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images in the same way that they react to reality.27 Naive realism
apparently is the natural default setting for visual common sense.
Subject to our unthinking gaze, which is mostly how we watch, the
screen seems to present a window onto reality. We tend to look
through the medium rather than at it.2 8  Moreover, once we
comprehend what we see, that's usually all we need to believe it. 9 In
other words, the familiar commonplace that "seeing is believing" is
not just idle folk knowledge-not that there is anything "idle" about
folk knowledge. Indeed, such knowledge is a major source not only
of mental content but also of the cognitive tools most people use
most of the time.3"
In this respect, we might say that Descartes got it wrong. We do
not first suspend disbelief and then deliberate on the truth or falsity
of what we have seen in a concerted effort to arrive at true
knowledge about the real. Rather, it seems that Spinoza's alternative
view of the matter is the correct one. First we perceive, and if we
comprehend our perception belief naturally follows." As Spinoza
understood, it is an extraordinary contradiction to perceive
something and not believe it to be the case.32 On this view, credulity
is humanity's default mode. It takes a good deal of mental energy to
confront an image for the purpose of critical assessment. And the
plain truth is that people tend to conserve their mental energy
whenever possible. Advertisers have learned this lesson well; with
breathtaking skill they have exploited the way our mental systems
emotional arousal. At the same time, they had decreases in activity in parts of the brain which are
involved in self-control." Id.
27. See BYRON REEVES & CLIFFORD NAss, THE MEDIA EQUATION: HOW PEOPLE TREAT
COMPUTERS, TELEVISION, AND NEW MEDIA LIKE REAL PEOPLE AND PLACES (1996); SHERRY
TURKLE, LIFE ON THE SCREEN: IDENTITY IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET (1995).
28. RICHARD A. LANHAM, THE ELECTRONIC WORD: DEMOCRACY, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE
ARTS 76 (1993).
29. See Prentice & Gerrig, supra note 18.
30. See, e.g., DOROTHY C. HOLLAND & NAOMI QUINN, CULTURAL MODELS IN LANGUAGE
AND THOUGHT (1987); GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT
CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987); VALDIMIR PROPP, MORPHOLOGY OF THE
FOLKTALE (Louis A. Wagner ed., Laurence Scott trans., 2d ed. 1970).
31. Daniel T. Gilbert, How Mental Systems Believe, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 107, 108
(1991).
32. Id.
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behave. Politicians have learned from the advertisers. And with
increasing frequency lawyers are following suit.33
Law, too, is going visual. It, too, is adapting to the reality-
shaping effects of visual mass media. By assimilating the way
human perception and cognition respond to what is on the screen,
however, law is also internalizing medium-appropriate ways of
thinking and communicating.34 The nonlinear logic of association
and the intensification and quickness of emotional responses to
visual legal evidence and argument are now being assimilated into
the practice of law. The ensuing impact on how decision makers
undertake the process we call "deliberation" has yet to be adequately
studied. It is probably only a matter of time before deliberation
incorporates the felt need for interactivity spurred by the
dissemination of computer-assisted data retrieval systems inside the
courtroom. Indeed, in some cases this is already taking place.35 This
kind of technological adaptation is not simply a matter of form. As
every good rhetorician, every good storyteller, and every good video
game designer knows, form and substance interpenetrate.
It is an intellectually challenging task even to begin to unravel
where content production leaves off and formal meaning making
begins. Most people are not concerned with such subtle processes.
Lawyers, however, must be. It is, after all, their bread and butter. If
lawyers do not know how to control the available media of
persuasion, what, then, do they offer? As the rhetorician Isocrates
taught two and half millennia ago in ancient Greece, eloquence
without wisdom is blind, and wisdom without eloquence is mute.36
33. See, e.g., Deborah A. Lilienthal, Litigation Public Relations: The Provisional Remedy of
the Communications World, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 895 (1999-2000); Avi J. Stachenfeld &
Christopher M. Nicholson, Blurred Boundaries: An Analysis of the Close Relationship Between
Popular Culture and the Practice of Law, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 903 (1996). See generally STUART
EWEN, PR! A SOCIAL HISTORY OF SPIN (1996); JAMES B. TWITCHELL, ADCULT USA: THE
TRIUMPH OF ADVERTISING IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1996) (tracing the evolution of public
relations and related persuasive techniques in the 1900s).
34. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES POP, supra note 4. See The Visual Persuasion Project,
http://www.nyls.edu/pages/2734.asp (last visited Feb. 13, 2007), for a broad range of examples of
visual evidence, visual argument, and visual mediation brochures being used in practice.
35. See Sherwin, Feigenson & Spiesel, supra note 23, at 39-40.
36. See NANCY S. STRUEVER, THE LANGUAGE OF HISTORY IN THE RENAISSANCE:
RHETORIC AND HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN FLORENTINE HUMANISM 21 (1970); cf
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, THE ORATIONS OF MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO bk. 1 (C.D. Yonge
trans., 1888), available at http://classicpersuasion.org/pw/cicero/dnvl-l.htn ("[W]isdom without
eloquence is but of little advantage to states, but that eloquence without wisdom is often most
mischievous, and is never advantageous to them.").
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In law's domain today, the rhetoric of visual representation
interpenetrates with the substantive dialectic of knowledge
production in the construction of truth and justice, emotion and
reason, law and desire.
In this way, we are moving toward a more sophisticated
understanding of what it means to say there is a two-way traffic
between law and popular culture, that real legal issues and
controversies give rise to popular legal representations just as
popular legal representations and mental processes help to inform
and shape real legal issues and real case outcomes. Our perceptions
and thoughts have rapidly adapted to the nature and demands of the
screen.37 For example, film viewers understand cross cutting and
parallel editing. They do not need anyone to explain these
storytelling devices. The camera is inside our heads and we are
prepared to reconstruct reality in accordance with the operative
perceptual and cognitive codes that help to make up our visual
common sense. In the same way we have learned to simultaneously
view multiple "windows" onto the real and the virtual, we have come
to accept simulations interspersed with real life documentation; and
we have willingly absorbed narratives with fragmented time lines
shaped by nonlinear ("associative") forms of logic. Consider, for
example, box office hits such as Michael Gondry's Eternal Sunshine
of the Spotless Mind,3 or Quentin Tarantino's Pulp Fiction," or
Christopher Noland's Memento.4" In these films, and a good many
other contemporary visual cultural products, audiences have learned
not only to do without linear chronology. Today's screen viewers
are comfortably postmodern. They can simultaneously hold in mind
the meaning of a given narrative as it unfolds on the screen together
with how that narrative comments on past screen productions
("meta-narration")-as in Keenen Ivory Wayans's Scary Movie41 or
Wes Craven's Scream42 and its progeny, or how certain features of a
visual narrative may be commenting on how the mind itself operates
37. See generally MCLUHAN, supra note 24 (discussing mass media, including film and
television, and their effect on audience members).
38. ETERNAL SUNSHINE OF THE SPOTLESS MIND (Anonymous Content et al. 2004).
39. PULP FICTION (A Band Apart et al. 1994).
40. MEMENTO (Newmarket Capital Group et al. 2000).
41. SCARY MOVIE (Brillstein-Grey Entertainment 2000).
42. SCREAM (Dimension Films & Woods Entertainment 1996).
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("hyper-reflexivity")-as in Spike Jones's Being John Malkovich43 or
Richard Linklater's Waking Life."
Recent studies in cognitive psychology have shown that our
world knowledge is often scripted by a mixture of fictional and
nonfictional claims.45 What we know (or think we know) draws
upon a mixture of fictional and nonfictional sources,46 and we are not
always able to differentiate real from fictional sources of
remembered information.47 So the blending of fantasy and reality
that often occurs on film, television and computer screens is not an
isolated phenomenon. In fact, the credibility of a particular image or
story may depend on its faithful emulation of fictional storytelling
techniques that fulfill popular expectations about what reality looks
like on the screen. This includes popular expectations about legal
reality. The striking irony is that facts can seem more "factual" the
more like fiction they become. This happens because people
generally are less motivated to process fictional information
systematically than factual information.48  When an audience
unwittingly responds to a factual presentation aided by familiar
fiction forms, the default mode-credulity-kicks in. Critical
analysis, not disbelief, gets suspended. Effective critique requires
not only knowledge of the requisite tools of critical analysis but also
the energy and inclination to undertake it.49 By contrast, stored
fictions effortlessly come to mind when a familiar narrative genre or
character or situation type stimulates recollection.
Law is not exempt from this familiar cognitive process.
Consider, for example, the prosecutors in real homicide cases who
compare the accused to film characters from Francis Ford Coppola's
The Godfather"° or Oliver Stone's Natural Born Killers,5 or the
state's attorney who establishes a "knowing and voluntary" waiver of
Miranda rights based on the defendant's familiarity with a popular
43. BEING JOHN MALKOVICH (Gramercy Pictures et al. 1999).
44. WAKING LIFE (Fox Searchlight Pictures et al. 2001).
45. Marcia K. Johnson & Carol L. Raye, Reality Monitoring, 88 PSYCHOL. REV. 67 (1981);
GERRIG, supra note 18; Prentice & Gerrig, supra note 18, at 544 n.4.
46. Prentice & Gerrig, supra note 18, at 529.
47. See, e.g., Johnson & Raye, supra note 45.
48. Prentice & Gerrig, supra note 18, at 544.
49. See Sherwin, Feigenson & Spiesel, supra note 23, at 250-51.
50. THE GODFATHER (Paramount Pictures 1972).
51. NATURAL BORN KILLERS (Warner Bros. Pictures et al. 1994).
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TV show. 2 Or consider in this regard the so-called "CSI effect,"
which derives from a cluster of popular television shows featuring
criminal science investigators armed with what are perceived to be
nearly infallible advanced forensic technologies. 3  There is a
concern, particularly among prosecutors, that these shows have led
some jurors to experience doubt when the prosecution's science falls
short. "Where's the DNA evidence? Something must be wrong with
the state's case."54  If the comparison with popular media scripts
sticks in their minds, jurors may be inclined to fill in the rest of the
story, reflecting familiar plot constructs and character traits
unmentioned at trial, even if they are fictional. The point is that
lawyers may have no choice but to adapt to the cognitive
environment in which they work, even if this means anticipating and
pre-empting, if possible, foreseeable jury expectations based on
popular fictions.
As with most new communication technologies, the proliferation
of computer-based digital images, graphics, multi-modal re-
enactments, "day in the life" video documentaries (and docudramas)
together with other forms of visual mass media are double-edged
swords when it comes to law. On the one hand, digital technology
inside the courtroom makes it possible to depict complex subjects
and events with previously unimagined clarity and detail. Yet,
precisely because of their ease of access and credibility ("seeing is
believing") visual images introduce new challenges.
52. See SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES POP, supra note 4, at 16-17.
53. Paul Rincon, CSI Shows Give "Unrealistic View," BBC NEWS, Feb. 21, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/4284335.stm (quoting forensics expert Dr. Max Houck).
54. See Richard Willing, 'CSI Effect' Has Juries Wanting More Evidence, USA TODAY,
Aug. 5, 2004, at IA, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-08-05-csi-
effectx.htm. Willing wrote:
The shows-CSI and CSI: Miami in particular-feature high-tech labs and glib and
gorgeous techies .... [T]he programs ... foster what analysts say is the mistaken
notion that criminal science is fast and infallible and always gets its man. That's
affecting the way lawyers prepare their cases, as well as the expectations that police
and the public place on real crime labs. Real crime-scene investigators say that
because of the programs, people often have unrealistic ideas of what criminal science
can deliver.
Id.; see also Janine Robben, The 'CSI' Effect. Popular Culture and the Justice System, 66 OR. ST.
B. BULL. 9, 9-10 (2005) (noting the disconnect between reality and television's portrayal of
forensic science). But see generally Tom Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt:
Managing Truth and Justice in Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050 (2006) (arguing that
there is no direct evidence that supports the CSI effect on jurors).
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The gist of these remarks may be expressed schematically as
follows:
NEW MEDIUM = NEW CONTENT = NEW FORM OF
EXPERIENCE = NEW THINKING = NEW DESIGN = NEW
TRAINING.
In what follows, I offer four "rules of thumb" to help us think
about how popular culture, and in particular how the tools of new
visual communication technologies, help to shape and inform the
way advocates and decision makers perform legal meanings in the
context of real cases. The four rules are:
(1) "SIMPLIFY THE COMPLEX"
(2) "EXPLOIT THE ICONIC"
(3) "EMULATE GENERIC FICTIONS (TO PRODUCE TRUTH)"
(4) "RESPECT THE MEDIUM"
The first rule of thumb is "simplify the complex." For example,
in a series of detailed video graphics, Legal Video Services
compellingly visualized the essence of the plaintiffs' legal claim. At
the center of the screen images of vividly colored ammonia
molecules mingled with nicotine inside a cigarette. Subsequent
images of key "nicotine binding sites" in the brain completed the
picture. Taken together, these instructive, easy to grasp, and highly
memorable visual displays quickly and effortlessly conveyed
complex technical information that went to the heart of the plaintiffs'
claim: the defendants' denials were groundless; their product, in
essence a highly efficient nicotine delivery system, was manifestly
designed to induce addiction-just as the plaintiffs' trial experts said.
Having now seen for themselves the defendants' product in action,
what more could the jurors want? Words alone could hardly match,
or easily offset, the immediate and enduring impact that this kind of
visual persuasion exerts on decision makers' thinking and judgment.
In a matter of seconds, plaintiffs had managed to "simplify the
complex." In so doing they rendered their theory of the case
immediately accessible to ordinary common sense.
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The second rule of thumb is, "exploit the iconic." By "iconic" I
mean here the strategic use of familiar pop cultural templates.55 The
illustrative visual, also produced by Legal Video Services, was taken
from an insider trading case. In this lawsuit, Martin Siegel was
accused of providing Ivan Boesky with inside information about a
bank takeover, allowing them both to profit unlawfully from the
pending deal. As a consequence, however, these illicit transactions
elevated the market value of plaintiffs takeover target well beyond
its predicted value. In the visual graphic that was designed for
plaintiffs' use in their closing argument, we see defendant Marty
Siegel perched in a three-by-three grid reminiscent of the tic-tac-toe
board featured in the once popular television game show, "The
Hollywood Squares."
When all nine Siegels simultaneously 'take the Fifth' the effect
is highly comical. The viewer laughs at such an incongruous sight:
here is Marty Siegel, the once esteemed mogul of Wall Street, cast in
55. My use of the term "iconic" is to be distinguished from the semiotic vocabulary of
Charles Sanders Peirce. According to Peirce,
There are three kinds of signs. Firstly, there are likenesses, or icons; which serve to
convey ideas of the things they represent simply by imitating them. Secondly, there
are indications, or indices; which show something about things, on account of their
being physically connected with them. Such is a guidepost, which points down the
road to be taken, or a relative pronoun, which is placed just after the name of the thing
intended to be denoted, or a vocative exclamation, as "Hi! there," which acts upon the
nerves of the person addressed and forces his attention. Thirdly, there are symbols, or
general signs, which have become associated with their meanings by usage. Such are
most words, and phrases, and speeches, and books, and libraries.
CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, WHAT IS A SIGN? 3 (1894), available at http://www.iupui.edu/
-peirce/ep/ep2/ep2book/chO2/cho2.htm.
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a TV game show-just like the celebrity has-beens desperate to
revitalize their careers (or at least make a buck) that the show
typically featured. That this humorous image and the normative
associations that it carries are being triggered by an iconic game
show remains implicit, unarticulated, and hence unavailable to
critical reflection (i.e., unconscious). The humor on display is
disarming, but there is a more serious intent at work here. The
visualization of the nine incanting Siegels simultaneously diminishes
and demonizes its subject. It diminishes Siegel by implicitly
portraying him as just another celebrity has-been. At the same time,
while Siegel may look comical ensconced in all nine Hollywood
squares, the humor at work serves to enhance-while also
masking-the real source of his guilty appearance. The comical
gloss distracts the decision maker from an implicit adverse inference
that also may be taking place: namely, the unconscious association of
Siegel with other so-called "Fifth Amendment criminals" who hide
the truth of their misdeeds behind a wall of silence.
To say that this apparently innocuous humorous visual display
demonizes the defendant for exercising his constitutional privilege
against compelled self-incrimination 56 not only seems counter-
intuitive from the standpoint of ordinary common sense (after all, the
video clips accurately depict what Siegel said at his deposition), but
it also spoils the simple fun of the display. In sum, the viewer gets
the message because the visual code of a popular television game
show icon is instantly recognizable, and the critical bite of a factually
suspect (albeit unconscious) inference remains hidden. To preserve
the joke, the viewer is disinclined to analyze it critically. As one trial
judge aptly put it, "when the screen goes on everyone forgets to
object." This may be one of the goals of "exploiting the iconic."
The third rule of thumb is, "emulate generic fictions (to produce
truth)." This rule reflects insights discussed above from recent social
psychology studies that have shown that different sources of
information are not always kept neatly separated in people's minds.
Truth readily intermingles with fiction. Our world-knowledge is
often scripted by a mixture of fictional and non-fictional claims. In
56. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment... forbids
either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such
silence is evidence of guilt."). But see Baxter v. Paligiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1978) (noting that
the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties in civil actions).
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this sense, we may say that the truth value of a particular image or
story may depend on its faithful emulation of fictional storytelling
techniques that fulfill popular expectations about what reality looks
like on the screen.
Consider in this regard the credibility of the "home video"
aesthetic, such as was seen in George Holiday's serendipitous
filming of the Los Angeles police officers who beat Rodney King.
The initial criminal assault case involved the prosecution of four Los
Angeles police officers for the roadside beating of Rodney King
following a prolonged chase. The trial became a contest not only
between untutored common sense and the counter-intuitive
knowledge base of professionally trained police officers, but also a
contest between high and low technology. In short, this case pitted
the genre of the 'amateur documentary' against the more
sophisticated genre of 'polished professionalism.' According to the
prosecutor, by simply watching the videotape the jurors would learn
all they needed to conclude that the police had used "excessive
force." And, indeed, throughout his summation, this was pretty
much all that the prosecutor had to say. "Just watch the tape."
Meanwhile, unbeknownst to the assistant district attorney, the
defense team had managed to thoroughly re-contextualize the
Holiday videotape, wrapping it in a completely different narrative.
Seen without the gloss of professional re-editing, the Holiday
videotape is shockingly violent. In the defense's digitized version,
however, the jurors saw another reality unfold before their eyes.
According to the lawyers who defended the officers, it was a reality
that was entirely consistent with the professionalism of the police in
action. By slowing down the action to a deliberate frame by frame
sequence, the defense's micro-analysis did more than simply remove
much of the violence from the scene. The chaos of officers shouting
and the loud thud of police batons striking a body amid the unsettling
background noise of an overhead helicopter were now gone. In their
place the silent digital version of the Holiday tape was accompanied
in court by the calm and evenly delivered live commentary of an
expert witness. The expert's stop-action analysis conveyed in no
uncertain terms the propriety of the officers' response to the situation
at hand. Stripped of all emotion-provoking cues, the scene could
now be clinically assessed through the eyes of those who had been
trained in the "escalation" and "de-escalation" of force. In this view,
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the "strokes" of the "PR-24 baton" appeared to come in direct
response to King's own aggressive resistance of arrest. 57  The
defense claim was as clear as it was simple: Rodney King himself
caused the police to act as they did. Indeed, they were simply
following the protocols of their training.
Studies have long shown that the perception of causation can be
evoked simply by showing the juxtaposition of two events in
58sequence. To support their claim that the officers had acted in
accordance with their professional training and that Rodney King
had in fact been "in charge" of the situation from the outset, the
defense needed to show causation on the screen. The digitized
version of the Holiday videotape did precisely that. The defense
strategy unfurled in three simple stages: First, it established the
protocols of police training. The officers had been taught to order
those subject to arrest to remain prone on the ground; force is to be
applied as needed to protect the officers and to ensure compliance.
Second, it constructed visual causation to show Rodney King
provoking the police to strike him. As the slow motion digitized
images revealed, King did not follow police orders; consequently,
every time he rose up off the ground, the PR-24 batons came down;
when King lay prone, the batons rose up; and when he continued to
resist, the batons came down again. Finally, it recapitulated the main
assertion. The police did what they were trained to do; Rodney King
caused the police to use their batons to compel him to comply with
their orders to lay prone on the ground. Had he not resisted arrest, he
would not have been struck.
The jury agreed. Indeed, after the verdict of acquittal, a number
of jurors in news media interviews repeated the defense's key
narrative point: Rodney King had been in charge all along. Little did
the prosecutor realize the futility of his exhortations to the jurors to
simply "watch the tape," for when they did so they "saw" the
defense's case theory being enacted. The discourse of profession-
alism in conjunction with the visual construction of causation had
managed to trump the untutored visual common sense of the jurors.
57. For an exhaustive treatment of the King beating and the various trial uses of the Holiday
videotape, see Ty Alper et al., Stories Told and Untold: Lawyering Theory Analyses of the First
Rodney King Assault Trial, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 1 (2005).
58. See BRUNER, ACTUAL MINDS, supra note 12, at 17 (noting that "when objects move
with respect to one another within highly limited constraints, we see causality").
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In the end, we can say that the prosecutor's naive realism undid
him. Contrary to his naive assumption, visual images do not make
meaning all on their own. Visual meaning is highly malleable. As
photojournalists know, captions can turn a photo's intended meaning
on its head. 9 If you do not provide a context of meaning, if you do
not wrap a sequence of images in a narrative of your own, you will
leave open the possibility that their meaning will be captured by the
narrative of another. That is why trial lawyers in the digital age of
on-screen reality must know how to "emulate generic fictions (to
produce truth)."
My final illustration addresses the last rule of thumb, namely:
"respect the medium." Whenever we shift to a new medium of
communication, whether it is print, photography, film, or massive
multi-player online gaming, we not only encounter new content, we
also become accustomed to new ways of experiencing and thinking
about that content. Just as the cultural templates and cognitive
59. The caption that accompanied the picture below was: "The mayor of Tyre said that in the
worst hit areas, bodies were still buried under the rubble, and he appealed to the Israelis to allow
government authorities time to pull them out." Posting of John Hinderaleer, Sorry, Wrong
Caption, to PowerLine (Aug. 9 2006), http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/014951.php.
The picture presumably depicted one of the "bodies. .. buried under the rubble," in the act of
being pulled out. Id. Only the "body" was very much alive, and hardly buried, as any but the
least skeptical photo editor could plainly see. On August 9, 2006, the Times issued the following
correction:
A picture caption with an audio slide show on July 27 about an Israeli attack on a
building in Tyre, Lebanon, imprecisely described the situation in the picture. The man
pictured, who had been seen in previous images appearing to assist with the rescue
effort, was injured during that rescue effort, not during the initial attack, and was not
killed.
The correct description was this one, which appeared with that picture in the
printed edition of The Times: After an Israeli airstrike destroyed a building in Tyre,
Lebanon, yesterday, one man helped another who had fallen and was hurt.
Corrections: For the Record, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/08/09pageoneplus/corrections.html. See generally SUSAN SONTAG, REGARDING THE PAIN
OF OTHERS 10 (2003) ("All photographs wait to be explained or falsified by their captions.").
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heuristics that we learn from early childhood on help to shape and
inform the way we perceive the world outside our skin, so too digital
image-making machines embody an underlying program that helps to
shape our internal sense of reality. Once our minds learn these
artificial programs they become "second nature" to us. Their
common sense logic is immediately "at hand" and "invisible" (which
is to say, unconscious).
This applies to common expectations that are generated by our
interaction with popular computer software and video gaming.
When digital information is on the screen, it seems increasingly
natural to play, to interact with what we see. It also seems
increasingly natural to absorb information through multiple media:
we expect to peer through multiple windows on the screen, and we
are used to simultaneously seeing, hearing, and reading information
as its multi-modal forms play out together over time.
This is precisely what jurors saw in the hyper-media summation
used by the state in the homicide prosecution of Kennedy cousin
Michael Skakel. During the Connecticut District Attorney's closing
argument in the trial of Michael Skakel for the murder, twenty-seven
years before, of fifteen-year-old Martha Moxley, jurors heard and
read Skakel's own words appear on the screen before them. And in
the instant that Skakel admitted to feeling a sense of "panic" when he
saw Martha Moxley's mother on the morning after the killing, there
on the very same screen appeared the image of Martha Moxley's
lifeless body, just as it was found at the scene of the murder.
Mrs. Moxley. Panic. Martha's young body.
arm ernbwjust
having afeelng of panic.
Like "Oh shlt.
You know.
Uke my worvy of what I went to bed with,
like may-., I don't know,
you know what I mean
I just had,
I had a feeling of panic.
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We understand the sequence. Of course Skakel experienced a
feeling of panic when Martha's mother asked him the next morning
if he had seen Martha the night before. The picture of Martha's
battered lifeless form immediately explains the implicit meaning of
his words. The viewer instantly makes the connection: immediately
upon being reminded that morning of the night before, Skakel must
have recalled with horror what he had done. Because Skakel's self-
professed emotional response and the viewer's reality-based
response to the screen image of Martha's lifeless body make sense in
combination, the latter is readily transferred to Skakel himself. The
viewer now "knows" for him or herself what Skakel was reacting to.
It is as if we were in his head. And the revulsion at what Skakel has
done readily casts an image of guilt in the viewer's mind. This
associative understanding is immediate; it elides the passage of
time-between the murder and the morning after (in 1975), and
between the time Skakel uttered these words (in 1997), and the time
they were replayed at the trial itself (in 2002). In short, the jury's
unconscious associations to the various media (Skakel's audio
commentary and its written version timed to coincide with the
victim's visual image) effectively allowed them to fill in the unstated
reason for Skakel's feeling of panic by vicariously associating, as
visually and aurally instructed, to its cause: Martha Moxley's
battered, dead body. In this way, the prosecution effectively ex-
ploited the virtues of multi-modal communication; as the fourth rule
of thumb requires, they had succeeded in "respecting the medium."
The above examples of my four rules of thumb are meant to
illustrate how the tools of new visual communication technologies
help to shape and inform the way advocates and decision makers
perform legal meanings in the context of real cases. Now, let us shift
our focus, consonant with the specific theme of this symposium. In
addition to considering how the tools and content of popular culture
help to constitute legal meanings inside the courtroom, let us now
consider how popular culture frames meaning in the courtroom of
public opinion when it comes to depicting lawyers on the screen.
Here, too, the four rules of thumb help us to assess what is going on.
For as it turns out, popular films take advantage of the same
cognitive and cultural heuristics that are busily at work constructing
(albeit invisibly) legal meaning inside the courtroom.
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Our first example is the box office hit Liar, Liar.6" The film's
theme is brilliantly announced even as the opening credits scroll
down the screen. We see an attorney named Fletcher Reede (played
by Jim Carrey) walking down the courthouse steps. In rapid
sequence Reede (1) replies to a colleague's affable "How's it
going?" with the gleefully sarcastic words, "Just another victory for
the accused," ("Yeah, right," his colleague returns); (2) refuses to
take back his suit jacket from a client, ("I'm sure you'll be needing it
-again and again."); and (3) initially fends off a woman seeking his
attention ("I'm sorry, it's my day to be with my son") until she
identifies herself as a reporter who wants to interview Reede about
his recent court victory (to which he instantly replies, as he joins her
down the steps, "How's my hair?").
In a matter of seconds, Liar, Liar, has managed to activate the
most trenchant and persistent negative stereotypes about lawyers. (1)
Lawyers lie. They will claim a "victory for justice" and say they are
servants of the truth in defense of their clients when they (and we)
know full well that neither truth nor justice has been served at all.
(2) Lawyers are cynical. They will not only actively misrepresent
their clients' appearance by dressing them up for trial, but they will
also happily accept that this ritual of misrepresentation will be
restaged "again and again." (3) Lawyers are vain and heartless. All
it takes is a quick promise of publicity for Reede to sacrifice his duty
as a father on the altar of personal vanity. Indeed, as we shall soon
see, Reede will not only sacrifice the interests of his own child, but
he will also do the same, with equal aplomb, when it comes to the
best interests of other fathers' children as well.
In this rapid sequence of scathing critique, film viewers witness
all four rules of thumb at work. The images they see on the screen
"simplify the complex," "exploit the iconic," "emulate generic
fictions (to produce truth)," and "respect the medium." To be sure,
without the aid of these unconscious cognitive heuristics, which
rapidly cue up and call into play the appropriate cultural patterns and
stereotypes, this opening series of rapid-fire vignettes could not carry
off its undeniably humorous effect. For that effect to be achieved,
viewers must be prepared to recognize and fill in the familiar
60. LIAR, LIAR (Imagine Entertainment & Universal Pictures 1997). Liar, Liar is one of the
top grossing lawyer films of all time, with a net box office take of $181,395,380. Business Data
for Liar, Liar (1997), http://www.imdb.com/title/tt01 19528/business (last visited Jan. 19, 2007).
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expectations that are being prompted by the words they hear and the
images they see on the screen. Only by actively filling in from their
own stock of popular knowledge can viewers vouch for themselves
the credibility of the screen meanings that they themselves help to
construct (and thus solidify in the process).
Consider, in this regard, the finer-grained depiction later on in
the film of Reede's cynical willingness to lie in order to advance his
career. In a subsequent scene, we see Reede preparing a female
client for trial. It is a child custody case.
LIAR, LIAR, supra note 60.
Even after learning of the client's "seven single acts of indiscretion,"
Reede nevertheless persists in persuading her that it is her husband,
not she who is at fault. On his knees before her, Reede takes the
client's hand as he smarmily intones, "Mrs. Cole, you're the victim
here." The trope of blaming the victim is a familiar act of moral
jujitsu, loaded with cultural ambivalence. It readily activates
feminist wisdom, even as it simultaneously evokes an impulse of
anti-feminist rebellion ("down with the politically correct").
The conventional feminist critique asserts that women,
particularly in sexual offense cases (such as date rape) are frequently
made to appear as willing participants in their own victimization.6'
61. See, e.g., Neal R. Feigenson, Accidents as Melodrama, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 741, 782
(1999-2000) ("The tendency to engage in defensive attribution-to blame the victims of rapes,
muggings, or environmental disasters in order to preserve one's faith that one will not be
victimized oneself-has been proven in many studies.") (citing Kelly Shaver, Defensive
Attribution: Effects of Severity and Relevance on the Responsibility Assigned for an Accident, 14
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The joke here, by taking the situation to an absurd extreme,
implicitly mocks feminist wisdom while leaving its truth unscathed.
The claim that Mrs. Cole is a victim in this case is patently absurd.
Her extra-marital dalliances clearly cast her character in a poor light,
leaving the alleged victimizer, her husband, doubly offended (first by
deed, second by word). But that, of course, is the source of the
scene's humor. Reede cannot possibly believe what he is saying. He
knows it, and the audience knows it. Consequently, the truth of the
feminist critique (gender bias protects male aggressors by
victimizing female victims) only serves to feed the comic effect of
the lawyer's lie (gender bias protects female adulterers by
victimizing their innocent husbands).62 Notably, this entire cognitive
process, together with the cultural knowledge in play, while active,
remains subliminal. We may laugh, but we do not immediately
know why. The speed of unconscious associations necessary to
make the joke work far exceeds the time available to make sense of
its component parts. Of course, a viewer unfamiliar with the
requisite cultural knowledge would be left to wonder why anyone is
laughing in the first place.
Greed and vanity are also at work in another popular lawyer
film, Taylor Hackford's The Devil's Advocate.63 Here, rather than
using humor as in Liar, Liar, the filmmaker mobilizes popular moral
authority in support of the film's severe condemnation of lawyers.
The central plot device in The Devil's Advocate is that the devil
himself is in league with the legal profession. How better to advance
the project of man's continued fall from grace into a cesspool of sin
than to mobilize the immoral deceits (and vain conceits) of lawyers.
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 101 (1970)); see also Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The
Blame Frame: Justifying (Racial) Injustice in America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 420
(2006) (pointing to evidence that suggests "we preserve our favorable self-images by attributing
responsibility to the harmed individuals, in extreme cases dehumanizing them as demons, beasts,
or brutes").
62. By implicitly re-asserting male integrity in the face of a feminist (albeit sorely distorted)
truth, the film also implicitly invites an anti-feminist backlash. That is, viewers predisposed to
laugh at the feminist critique may also find permission here to do so. See Paul A. LeBel, The
Good, The Bad, and the Press, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1074, 1082 (1986) (reviewing RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS (1986)) ("The temptation not only to blame the victim but to snicker
at the victim's resort to the legal system for redress might be resisted more easily if one considers
the changes in the media that have accompanied the 'thinning of the American skin' that
Professor Smolla perceives.").
63. THE DEVIL'S ADVOCATE (Warner Bros. Pictures et al. 1997).
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Consider Kevin Lomax (played by Keanu Reeves): Unbe-
knownst to him through most of the film, Kevin is the devil's own
son. It should come as little surprise, therefore, that by the time he
joins his father, "John Milton" (played by Al Pacino), the satanic
head partner of a powerful international New York law firm, as a
young associate, this honey-tongued prot~g6 had never lost a case.
Kevin is understandably proud of his accomplishments. And in the
penultimate scene in the film, it is precisely this deep sense of vanity
that Milton successfully manipulates in an effort to get Kevin to
actively embrace his fate as the devil's foremost agent of evil in the
world. To this end, Milton reminds Kevin of the immoral choices
that Kevin willingly made for the sake of victory in court. They
range from cruelly shifting moral blame onto a young victim in his
defense of an unremorseful pedophile in one case, to suborning
perjury from a key witness in order to obtain a desperately needed
alibi for a client in a homicide case.
Step by step, Milton builds his case against his son's rapidly
shredding moral integrity. When Kevin seeks to evade personal
responsibility ("You put me there, you made her lie [on the witness
stand]"), Milton sets him straight by reminding him that the devil
may trick humans, but he has no power to directly interfere with free
will ("I don't do that, Kevin"). Milton even takes credit for ex-
plicitly giving Kevin an opportunity to avoid moral compromise, like
the time when he told Kevin straight out that maybe it was "his time
to lose." And with that, the trap has been sprung. Milton's all too
successful son finally lets his pride get the better of him: "Lose?" he
shouts. "I don't lose. I win. I'm a lawyer. That's my job. That's
what I do. I win." After an impeccably timed pause, Milton mildly
replies, "I rest my case.... Ah, vanity, my favorite sin."
This scene offers us yet another instance of the third rule of
thumb at work: "emulate the generic." In Liar, Liar, the film made
the same point playing off of the emotional truth of selfish fathering.
We all carry around in our heads images of what poor parenting
looks like, and Jim Carrey's character in Liar, Liar embodied that
image in spades. In The Devil's Advocate, the film works off of a
common moral vernacular: temptation, greed, vanitas-we all
recognize these as the cardinal sins to which humanity is prone. And
by the film's end, there can be no doubt: this young devil's seed
lawyer has repeatedly acted in a way that manifestly warrants the
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film viewer's strongest moral condemnation. Our most cherished
cultural values, skillfully mobilized by the biblical narrative in play,
tell us this is so. Once having been cued up in our minds, our moral
common sense quickly fills in the appropriate condemnatory
judgment of the character in question. In The Devil's Advocate, that
moral condemnation is part and parcel of an entertaining film
experience. Yet, the same cultural authorities, deliberately
implicated by similarly implicit cognitive processes, have very real
effects in the everyday life of the law.
In a democratic republic such as our own, in which the rule of
law prevails and prudent deliberation serves as the watchword of
justice, the cultural and cognitive components of legal meaning
making, in lay and judicial judgments alike, ought to be known. We
can ill-afford the lack of thorough training in civics as well as in
contemporary forms of rhetoric. In the current digital age, much of
the content and many of the tools of legal meaning making have
changed from what they once were. The education of lawyers,
judges, and citizens must follow suit.
And so, having duly struck the imperative note that all worthy
manifestos are expected to sound, this visual legal realist manifesto
stands ready to conclude.
CONCLUSION
A stable society settles upon a shared repertoire of rhetorical
elements for its members to mix, remix, and supplement at need -
consonant with the shifting demands of the times - in order to
maintain the preferred stock of social meaning. In a largely visual
society, our rhetorical moves will naturally include a visual code and
a visual toolkit. Explicit knowledge regarding the content and craft
of visual communication allows for greater deliberation and skill in
the visual persuasion process as well as in the judgments that it
promotes. We call this state of affairs "visual literacy." In a visually
literate culture, legal advocates and cultural critics alike understand
how we get our visual knowledge from the screen and what kind of
knowledge this is. Visual literacy allows us consciously to confront
gaps and distortions in our screen-based knowledge and, in so doing,
allows us, with the aid of visual and other sources of knowledge and
forms of cognition, to arrive at sounder judgments.
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Of course, my invitation here to learn more about how popular
culture shapes images of lawyers says nothing about the truth or
falsity of those images. Paradoxically perhaps, many of the critiques
of lawyers that we find in the movies today mirror the kinds of in-
house critiques that one finds in legal academia. For example,
former Yale Law School Dean Anthony Kronman has noted that bad
things happen when the legal profession becomes no more than a
commercial trade, when legal knowledge becomes a commodity sold
to the highest bidder, when greed displaces professional ethics, and
when the pressures of the marketplace alienate lawyers from the
better part of who they are.'
Personally, I do not think the game is lost. We may concede
that commercialization, hyper-competition, and greed are part of the
problem. But another part is that other kinds of stories-stories
about lawyers as knights of faith, stories about lawyers, both in the
public sector and in private practice, who work for the public good-
are not being told often enough. We need to do more to re-capture
the lawyer's image. We need to produce true stories of service and
virtue. In this regard, we may find ourselves turning increasingly to
the distributed resources of the Internet as a great cultural equalizer
even in the face of Hollywood's vertically-integrated engines of
culture production. The Internet can generate and widely dissemi-
nate well-crafted, compelling counter-images. It is, of course, a two-
way street. If more members of the profession were to engage in
more ethical and more inspiring acts of social service, that would
help to facilitate precisely this type of affirmative culture production.
And who knows? Over time, the current pool of excessively nega-
tive popular images of lawyers might give way to a truer picture of
the profession as a whole. Gazing into that mirror, perhaps more
lawyers and lawyers to be might find the warrant they need to be
truer to the self they hold most dear.
64. See generally ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION (1993) (describing a spiritual crisis in the legal profession caused by valuing
legal technique above the search for wisdom and truth).
